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ABSTRACT:
This case study of the Matla Trust Voter Education Research project analyses voting-related
attitudes in the run-up to South Africa's 1994 election. The study was aimed at the
empowerment of voters. Empowerment is defined along the lines of the motivation and the
skills to participate in the election. The research methodology used, was qualitative focus
groups and a major, quantitative, baseline attitude survey. The latter was designed to reflect
the attitudes of the whole of the S,n.ili African electorate. It was unique in that it did detailed
regional and demographic companions. The research illuminates the meaning which South
African voters attached to, and feelings they had about, voting, elections and democracy. The
study also identifies the "demographic fault lines" in empowerment to vote and to participate.
The paper first investigates the extent of motivation to vote and reasons for voting.
Motivation was high, also well before the election. The reasons for voting shed light on the
meaning attached to democracy and voting. They also give important information on the
expectations the voters have of a new government. The research showed systematic
demographic disempowerment in terms of voting skills. Whilst indications are that these were
overcome in a largely successful April 1994 election, continued work is required to advance
empowerment for wider political participation. The paper also provisionally investigates some
implications of this case study for the deepening of democracy in South Africa.
FRAMEWORK:
1. Voter education, empowerment, and the Matla Research Project
2. Research methodology
3. Expectations and anticipation of the elections
4. Disempowerment and the challenges to voter education
5. Assessment of participation outcomes
6. The implications for democracy
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I. VOTER EDUCATION, EMPOWERMENT, AND THE MATLA RESEARCH
PROJECT1
The success of South Africa's 1994 election could not he taken for granted. Inevitably il
would he the much vaunted liberation election. But in the approximately eighteen months
prior to the election there was ample evidence th?t voters had become weary of the long and
frustrating transition, and that their expectations were being tempered by violence. The mood
of the electorate had two major currents: anticipation and expectations versus
disempowerment through lack of motivation, feelings of fear, and through the absence of
voting skills.
The voter education challenges for the purposes of this research project were identified on
two levels. The process had to start with an assessment of both the motivation and the skills
to vote.2 The tasks would be. first, to prepare the electorate by teaching voting skills, both
ballot literacy and process knowledge, and to facilitate identity document dissemination.
Second, the task would he to help nurture a high voter turnout. This would help ensure the
legitimacy of the elections. The motivation to participate builds on the empowerment1 skills.
To achieve a high turnout it would be necessary to motivate voters who were unsure whether
they would vole, as well as to reassure the uncertain turnouts who had specific constraints.
Motivation for participation equally is a form of empowerment. Through participation voters
express their needs and potentially become aware of how governments act (or do not) on
these needs. We therefore talk about a mutually strengthening, symbiotic relationship between
motivation to vote and equipping people with voting skills.
These voter education challenges could only be met if voter education agencies themselves
were empowered through thorough research. Such research would have to identify the
feelings and needs of the electorate. It would also have to be specific and detailed enough
to enable voter educators to develop detailed and targeted strategies for empowerment and
motivation. It was in this context that Matla Trust commissioned Research Initiatives, in
cooperation with Marketing & Media Research and Decision Surveys International, to
undertake a major three phase research project. This project used a combination of qualitative
and quantitative research methodologies to identify the possible stumbling blocks in the way
of successful elections.
This paper therefore presents a case study of voting-related attitudes and skills in the run-up
lo the 26-29 April 1994 South African election. The Malla Voter Education Research Project
is unique in that it did detailed and systematic regional and demographic analyses of issues
affecting the empowerment of voters. It is also one of the biggest voter education surveys
conducted in preparation lor the election. It informed the work of both Matla Trust (the most
prominent of the South African voter education agencies) and the broader Independent Forum
for Electoral Education (IFEE) '
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, it hopes to promote an understanding of the
"uncertain voters", of their concerns, fears and feelings about voting. It is important to
understand how these relate to the mood in the country. Second, the paper works towards
a detailed understanding of how motivation to participate and voting skills relate to the
empowerment of the South African electorate. Third, the paper assesses some implications
of this case study for the further extension of democratic political participation, and for the
deepening of democracy in South Africa. (The details and dynamics of the election itself, and
the details of voter education activities which were undertaken on the basis of this research
data, fall outside the ambit of this case study.)
The paper focuses on the two major parts of the Matla Voter Education Research Project.
First, it reports on the qualitative findings of the focus groups conducted in' late 1992. These
groups concentrated on the uncommitted5 voters who were uncertain voter turnouts. Their
feelings and motivations were the subject for in-depth analyses. Understanding the extent and
possible reasons for abstention among the uncommitted voters was an important objective.
The uncertain voters, for instance, had major misgivings about voting. Closer to the election
motivation of the voters, in general, built up and both specific expectations and a mood of
great anticipation emerged. This is also elaborated.
Second, this paper focuses on the 8000 Voter Education Baseline Survey. The objective of
this phase of the research project was to facilitate a detailed understanding of voter
empowerment differences between regions, and between a variety of demographic groups
within each of the regions. Possible abstention because of lack of ballot literacy, confusion
about the voting process, or lack of facilitating identity documents, had to be countered.
Apart from the detailed comparisons, the survey would also provide the authoritative national
picture of the electorate.6 Precise targeting for voter education programmes could flow from
such detailed understanding. Special attention is given to demographic facets of motivational
and skills disempowerment, especially along the lines of gender, age education, and level of
urbanisation. We investigate, for instance, whether women, either the young or the old,
people from less advantaged formal education backgrounds, or from n• :! areas, were
systematically disempowered in terms of potential participation in the election. Detailed
information is provided on how the voting issues of intention to vote and varying motivations
to vote, belief in secrecy of the ballot, access to the mass media, ballot literacy, and the
possession of identity documents were affected by demographic characteristics.
The relevance of the Matla research data extends beyond the challenges of conducting
legitimate elections and empowering the new electorate for voting. The research also focused
on what the election and voting meant to the new electorate. In the analysis of reasons why
people wanted to vote, or why they wanted to abstain, information was derived which could
assist in the further development of democracy in South Africa. It indicates the close
association in voters' minds between liberation-democracy-equal rights on the one hand, and
the improvement of social conditions on the other hand. The data could leave no political
party or government in doubt about the extent of action required to advance and develop
democracy in South Africa. In the current phase of South Africa's transition we have
achieved voting and procedural democracy. For the further development of democracy, there
are two broad requirements. First, people need to experience an improvement in their social
and economic lives. The Matla research data helps define the parameters of what South
Africans expect their votes to signify to a new government. Second, there needs to be
empowerment for continuous participation, beyond the act of voting. To achieve this, the
teaching of the skills to participate in the new system of government, as well as the
dissemination of issue knowledge, are required.
The rest of this paper first elaborates on the research methodology of the project, then
assesses the motivation for voting and meaning attached to the process, and after that
addresses the nature and extent of obstacles to empowerment and participation. In conclusion,
some of the implications of this research project for ihe development and consolidation of
democracy in South Africa are considered.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: FOCUS GROUPS AND BASELINE SURVEY
The Matla Trust Voter Education Research Project extended from 1992 into 1994. The
analysis employed an eight region specification of South Africa (the regional demarcations
at the time of Ihe research).7 Where directly comparable data from other surveys were
available, these are referred to in this paper.
The two crucial phases of the Matla project were the qualitative focus groups (October to
December 1992) at the beginning of the research, and the quantitative baseline national
survey at the culmination of the project (June 1993-March 1994). The 1992 focus groups
provided an in-depth understanding of the major reasons why some black South Africans who
would qualify to vote were either reluctant or declared a determination not to vote.
The planning and implementation of the focus groups:1
This phase of qualitative research focused on voters who had no strong party identification
and were not motivated to vote. The objective was to gain an in-depth understanding of
possible abstention in the election. The focus therefore was on Ihe uncommitted, changeable
(swing) voters.
A total of 24 focus groups were conducted with uncommitted voters. Like focus groups
generally, these groups entailed in-depth, qualitative analyses of group discussions of six to
eight people. The participants were carefully selected, using a recruitment questionnaire.
Considerations in recruitment were gender, age, employment status, race, language, urban
versus rural, and voter intention. The rural groups were drawn from the then Lebowa and
Gazankulu areas, and the Orange Free State, and the urban groups from
Johannesburg/Soweto, Durban and surrounding areas, and Cape Town and Paarl. Each of
the focus groups was demographically compatible, for instance gender homogenous, as well
as age and social status compatible. In the recruitment interview potential participants were
only told that the discussion would focus on socio-political issues. This was to ensure that
they would not "rehearse" issues (an important consideration in focus group research). The
focus groups were conducted by experienced moderators employed by DSI. The moderators
were demographically similar to the participants. The moderators were all experienced and
underwent thorough briefings. They used a structured discussion guide with specific time
allocations for particular sections. The discussion guide was developed out of team
workshops from August to October 1992 (see Appendix I for the themes that were dealt
with). The discussions lasted just over two hours, and participants received a small
remuneration.
The planning and implementation of the baseline survey:
The Baseline Survey entailed the individual, personal interviewing of respondents, using a
structured questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for a list of question themes). There were also
certain questions where respondents were asked to give spontaneous answers. These were
recorded by the interviewers. The quantitative research method of this stage of the research
process was essential, because the researchers wished tu draw detailed comparisons between
regions. It was also the appropriate research methodology, because we had to get the
authoritative picture, representative of the total South African electorate.
A number of challenges had to be overcome to bring the baseline survey to fruition. There
was no single set of reliable data from which the sample could be drawn. Rural black South
Africans in the past were only, marginally, surveyed for commercial concerns. There were
few precedents to use to gain a representative sample for election issues.9 Great care had to
be taken to include this rural population in the sample, in proportion to its estimated size in
the overall population. Field workers had to go to great lengths to ensure access, often in
difficult and dangerous circumstances. Because of high levels of illiteracy and sometimes
divergent cultures, the formulation of questions also demanded great care. The problems
were overcome through many months of team work between Malta, Research Initiatives,
Marketing & Media Research (MMR) and Decision Surveys International (DSI).
The interviews were conducted by trained DSI interviewers, wherever possible in the
respondents' homes. Interviewers received detailed briefings before the start of fieldwork.
Field supervisors did daily checks on the interviews and a minimum of 20% were back-
checked. Continuous monitoring ensured uniformity of approach. All interviewers were
selected and assigned to be demographically compatible with the people who were to be
interviewed.
A standard, structured questionnaire was used for all interviews. The response of each
individual was entered on a separate questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated into
English, Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and Afrikaans, and the respondents were interviewed in their
home languages, or in the language of their choice. The questionnaire was extensively piloted
and refined prior to the start of the fieldwork.
The sampling procedure started with the universe being defined as all men and women aged
17 years or older, who were South African citizens and would qualify to vote on reaching
18 years by the time of the election. The sample was an area stratified random sample. In
a few areas where conditions on the ground (especially violence) made it impossible to
conduct a random sample, sampling was done by the quota method. This was necessary in
parts of the East Rand and the Vaal Triangle. In such cases, respondents would be
interviewed around their places of work. Within the specified parameters, the sample was
drawn by an independent research consultant, who also assisted in determining the
appropriate weights. The margin of error for the current analysis was estimated at 3%
maximum for national level analyses. On the regional level it would be 6-7% maximum.
Interviews with a total of 8004 South African voters were used for this analysis. The
interviewing was done in the period from mid-July until the end of August 1994. By race
diversification, 4652 interviews were conducted with African voters, 1600 with coloured
voters, 800 with Indian voters and 1600 with white voters. Some measure of proportionality
was maintained in deciding the number of interviews in racial sectors. Caution had to be
taken that each sector would remain big enough to be analysed. To illustrate the regional
spread of interviews, among Africans 952 interviews were conducted with PWV voters, 581
in the Northern Transvaal, 375 in the Northwest, 382 in the Eastern Transvaal, 382 in the
Western Cape, 752 in the Eastern cape, 379 in the Orange Free State, and 849 in Natal. All
regions and racial sectors were weighted to the appropriate proportion of the population in
that region. In drawing the sample, it was also ensured that it would reflect the national
population in distribution between metropolitan, urban and rural.
Data interpretation was facilitated through a large number of research team workshops,
which dealt with issues ranging from defining data runs, to detailed analyses and report
designs. The final research report was presented at a Matla Trust March 1994 media
conference.
In the interpretation of data the four South African race groups were analysed separately.
Preliminary analyses showed racially diversified trends, for instance very different needs for
voter education or feelings about elections. Ignoring these differences would have meant
equalising divergent trends and ignoring specific needs. Within race groups we further
distinguished between a variety of demographic categories, including gender differences, age
and income groups, and different levels of formal education.
Much of the current paper's data interpretation will be substantiated through the provision
of tables and diagrams. However, the regionally diversified analysis implies the usage of a
very large number of tables or diagrams. Consequently, only key ones are incorporated into
this paper, in Appendix 2 (diagrams) and Appendix 3 (tables). Table and diagram numbers
are indicated in the text. Although these diagrams and tables facilitate more detailed
understandings, the reading of the text does not depend on the simultaneous scanning of the
tables.
3. MOTIVATION TO VOTE AND WHAT THE VOTE MEANT
From early on in the research project there was evidence that the new South African
electorate had high levels of anticipation and were highly motivated to participate in the April
1994 elections. They clearly felt highly empowered on the motivational level, even if they
were still lacking voting skills. There were political, demographic and race variations, but
the large majority had little doubt that they would participate.
The Matla research findings on the levels of motivation to vote and the reasons why people
thought it would be important to vote provide useful information on the meaning attached to
voting. It tells us why turnout was high in the April election. Simultaneously, it informs us
on the expectations of the voters -- and therefore on what their demands on the new
government would be. These are the expectations and demands that the South African
government will have to act on in order to give substance to "the vote". It is this government
action or inaction that will help establish or undermine trust in and legitimacy of
representative democracy.
This section first analyses the Matla Focus Group findings on reasons why even politically
uncommitted voters, in the early pre-election period of November to December 1992, were
determined to bring out their votes. This determination emerged, despite otherwise highly
ambivalent feelings and in some cases even a fear of voting. The section then assesses
national trends in the Matla Baseline Survey on vote intention, and briefly compares these
with two comparable survey studies. Following thai, it investigates regional, demographic
and race sector variations in motivation and reasons lor voting.'"
THE FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION AND VOTING
"The coming of elections would be like the time when the bird is being set free ..." These
words conveyed the general feeling about elections among participants in the focus groups.
Equally remarkable, is that sentiments like these were expressed despite the focus group
participants not being committed political party supporters, and despite the fact that they also
harboured many fears, cynicism and confusion regarding the elections (see Section 4).
Focus group participants talked about participation in elections in terms of "costs"
(disadvantages, fear) and "benefits" (blessings, gains). The "costs" (Section 4) could stand
in the way of participation in the elections. The "benefits" could drive them to participate,
despite adverse conditions. A high proportion of focus group participants at that 1992 stage
thought that the costs of voting outweighed the benefits. The costs and the benefits at that
stage, however, still existed side-by-side, without being specifically weighed up against each
other. In the focus groups the same people would sometimes talk about their great
anticipation and expectations, and their fears and doubts about elections. These contradictions
probably were largely the result of the fact that elections were still more than a year away,
disempowerment because of lacking voting knowledge and skills, and the often despondent
mood of that period in South African history.
In describing their expectations of a democratically elected government, the focus group
participants used extremely rich, flowing language. Some of the images that were called up
were: "jubilation", "happiness", "black victory", "progress", "significant change", "a better
future for my children", "election of my ideal leader", etc.
Some quotations demonstrate the mood: "It will be like a wild bird set free" (middle class
coloured man. Cape Town); "Maybe elections will make us sleep at night ... Maybe God
will help us" (older African woman, Lebowa); "I will be mad with happiness, I's even break
down all these shacks" (African working class man, So we to). Such expectations were
present, in varying degrees, in all the focus groups.
The major anticipated "benefit" of voting was found in the positive expectations of a
democratic government. Three kinds of positive expectations emerged: The prospect of
democracy, choice, participation and citizenship; the prospect of a black, broadly sympathetic
government in power; and the prospect of specific material benefits, or improvement in
social conditions, accruing from a new government, e.g. education, food, housing.
In the first category an English-speaking coloured man from Cape Town, said: "An election
will mean I will be a South African, not just a person." In the second category, a typical
statement: "We shall vote to get ourselves a government that will give us a new life"
(African working class man, Soweto), and "Maybe someone will tell the government about
us and something would be done" (African male farm worker, OFS). In the third category,
there were elaborate group discussions. An African woman from Gazankulu had no doubts:
"I'll vote for Mandela. He will give me a job". Or, "People are starving. Maybe the new
government will help provide us with something to eat" (African man, Gazankulu), and
"Maybe it will make blacks own farms too ... It might also bring luxury like better housing
and jobs, better salaries as well" (African woman, Lebowa). It was mainly coloured and
Indian participants who cautioned against expectations being too high. According to this
Indian man, Durban: "An election will not bring immediate change. It will take around ten
years to make this country really stable again."
THE BASELINE SURVEY RESEARCH ON EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
MOTIVATION
As South Africa moved closer to the election, there emerged a clear, widespread commitment
to vote. The political mood in the country changed. Violence and often agonizing
negotiations persisted. But as the advent of the elections drew closer. South Africa's new
electorate increasingly showed a determination to vote. They were also very clear about why
they would want to vote. The determination was especially pronounced for African voters.
Later in the election campaign, as showed in subsequent surveys, the commitment to vote
amongst coloured and Indian voters rose."
In this section I analyse this enthusiasm for, and expectations of, elections, as expressed in
the quantitative components of the Matla Baseline Survey. In doing this, we should bear in
mind that high motivation to vote could still fail to become translated into legitimate election
outcomes. For instance, high levels of spoilt ballots could make people feel that they "had
been cheated", or many who want to vote could be turned away because of a lack of identity
documents, or many could still abstain because they fear intimidation, violence, the effects
of "known voting", or because of a lack of voting skills (see Section 4).
Vote intention:
From the baseline research, conducted in July to August 1994, it became clear that South
Africa was potentially going to see a typically high liberation election turnout. A large
majority of African (83%) and white (85%) voters declared that they would vote "if the
election took place tomorrow". Small majorities of coloured (50%) and Indian (55%) voters
wanted to vote at that stage. (See Diagram 1, Appendix 2.)
The potential for an even larger turnout was indicated by the fact that, in addition the above,
11% of African voters did not rule out the possibility that they might vote. This applied to
31% of coloured, 22% of Indian, and 7% of white voters. Only 6% African and 8% white
were determined that they would not vote. The corresponding percentage for coloured voters
was 19% and for Indian 23%. Considering the respective sizes of racial sectors of the
electorate (African 72%, coloured 9%, Indian 3%, and white 16%) a high percentage poll
could be expected.
These turnout findings can usefully be compared to subsequent surveys which were conducted
by other research agencies. Different timing of the research, different samples and sample
sizes, varying question formulations, and progress with voter education and party political
campaigns help account for the differences. Changing trends also reflect the changing overall
mood in the country. For instance, the research by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy '
(IMPD, early March 1994), implemented in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research
Council, found that 84% of African, 77% of coloured, 65% of Indian, and 76% of white
voters definitely intended voting. Additional percentages said they miglu. CASE (April 1994)
tracking research for the Independent Forum for Electoral Education found that 86% of
Africans intended voting, compared to 81% of coloureds at that stage. These findings differ
from the Matla Baseline Study mainly in the area of coloured vote intention (which rose
closer to the election). The Matla Baseline Study's findings on reasons for possibly not voting
had indicated the potential for this consolidation. The HSRC (1994:3), on the basis of a 2286
February 1994 poll, safely estimated that between 66% and 93% of the voting population
would vole.
A regional comparison of vote intention among African voters in the Matla Baseline Survey
showed that in all regions large percentages of African voters wanted to vote, generally
ranging from 80-percent upward. The two exceptions were the Eastern Transvaal and Natal
(74% in each case) (also see the analysis of reasons for not wanting to vote, Section 4). The
regions with the highest African vote intention were the Western and the Eastern Cape, 95%
and 93%, respectively. In Natal there was a high uncertainty factor. A total of 20% said they
were not sure whether they would vote or not. (See Table 1, Appendix 2.)
A demographic and regional comparison of vote intention mostly showed a mutual
reinforcement between different demographic components of disempowerment. As alluded
to in the Introduction, the most disempowered in terms of voting skills and motivation tend
to be the reinforcing demographic categories of women, older people, those with lower
education, and predominantly in rural areas. In most regions gender strongly differentiated
between those who intended voting or not. The gender gap in most regions was around 10%.
A drastic aggravation was the Eastern Transvaal, where 23% more men than women declared
that they intended voting. There were varying trends regarding age and vote intention. In the
Northern and Eastern Transvaal, as well as the Free State and Natal, the two younger age
groups were much more likely than the 50+ year-olds to want to vote. Education fairly
consistently discriminated between those who wanted to vote or not. In all cases but the
Western and the Eastern Cape, and the Northwest (in this case around 6%), those formally
educated up to Standard 4" would be at least 10% less likely to vote. The level of
urbanisation made a big difference in intention to vote in the OFS, Natal and the Eastern
Transvaal. The greater the distance from the metropolitan areas of the country, the less likely
the voters in these regions were to say that they would vote."
Reasons for voting:
A preliminary comparison of reasons for wanting to vote showed divergent trends between
African, coloured, Indian and white voters. The five top reasons given by African voters
were: freedom, equal rights or democracy; more jobs; better living conditions; to gel a
government of choice; and to end apartheid or discrimination. There were some similarities
between the motivations of coloured and Indian voters. For coloured voters the top three
motivations were a belter life for their families, followed by equal rights or democracy, and
then peace. Peace was the most important consideration for Indian voters, followed by a
better life for their families and democracy/equal rights. White voters appeared to be driven
by a very different dynamic. First came citizen duty, then to get a government of their own
choice, and a better life for their families. The fourth most important white motivation for
voting was to "prevent black government". (See Table 2, Appendix 3.)
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Across all regions, African voters most consistently stated reasons related to the achievement
of freedom and democracy. In reply to the question "What is the most important reasons why
you want to vote?" (a follow-up question after respondents had indicated that they wanted to
vote in the election), 48% of African voters mentioned reasons related to the achievement
of freedom, democracy and power.
Not far behind the democracy/liberation answer, was "material improvement" - explicitly
given as the most important reason to vote. A total of 37% spontaneously cited reasons,
either specific or general, that were related to better material conditions. Peace and order
reasons were mentioned by 8% of the African voters, and citizen duty by 5%.
Coloured voters, in about equal proportions mentioned freedom/democracy and material
improvement, with the latter slightly more prevalent. For Indian voters, democracy
considerations were also the most important. This was the case too for white voters, albeit
with a different meaning attached. Citizen duty rated very strongly for whites.
There were meaningful demographic variations. A regional and demographic comparison
of motivations to vote show that certain demographic groupings of voters were much more
inclined to name material or social condition reasons. Among the African voters, these
tended to be women, older, rural, lower education and low income voters. In the PWV, as
in other regions, it would predominantly be men, of the younger age groups, with higher
education levels, and living in the clearly metropolitan area who cited
freedom/democracy/equal rights. In a mostly rural region like the Northern Transvaal, the
achievement of better living conditions emerged as strong rival for explicit freedom
motivations in the overall regional results. The Northwest, the Eastern Transvaal and the
Eastern Cape were other regions which provided substantiation of the gender-age-education-
urbanisation demographic trend. These trends were not strongly pronounced in the Western
Cape. The Orange Free State and Natal were the two regions where the improvement of
social conditions, including the creation of jobs, ranked higher than direct liberation
motivations. The demographic trends still held.14
These spontaneous replies, where respondents could use their own words and emphases to
describe their most important motivation to vote, shed light on the magnitude of election
turnout (also see Section 5) and on the meaning attached to democracy and voting. The focus
groups discussions provided graphic detail on he meaning attached to the vote. No absolute
separation between liberation, on the one hand, and improvement of social conditions on the
other, should be deduced from the dual categorisation of motivations to vote. The two are
closely related. The mentioning of "achievement of power", "getting rights", or "having a
sympathetic government" does not exist in a vacuum. They have liberation connotations, and
relate to substantive social conditions. For instance, the importance of achieving power lies
in the difference this power should make to people's lives. These dynamics will continue to
shape the post-clcclions climate in South Africa.
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4. OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES OF LACK OF MOTIVATION AND
DISEMPOWERMENT
Important problems had to be overcome to ensure consistently high motivational and skills
empowerment. This section deals with findings on the obstacles of, first, the lack of
motivation and, second, the lack of appropriate voting skills as these emerged in the Focus
Group and Baseline Studies. One has to bear in mind the interactive, symbiotic relationship
between voting skills and motivation. More voting skills would help ensure a higher level of
motivation to vote; a high motivation could serve as the encouragement to acquire the
necessary voting skills. Together, voting skills and motivation impart the empowerment for
participation through voting.
Voting skills disempowerment included the fear of violence, low levels of possession of
identity documents, confusion about politics and voting processes, doubts about ballot
secrecy, and the lack of ballot literacy. While only some of these challenges were in the
direct ambit of voter education functions, voter education agencies could, through a process
of educating about both secrecy of the ballot, and the procedures and security measures
around campaigning and voting, help reduce the "costs" of voting.
The research reported on in this section strives, first, to give an in-depth picture of the fears
and feelings of disempowerment, and second, to specify the extent and dimensions of
disempowerment of South Africa's new voters in the period leading up to the election. As
in the previous section, I report on both the 1992 Matla Focus Groups and the 1994 Matla
Baseline Survey. Two, diverse sets of research data were generated. The Focus Group
analysis deals with the "uncertain voters", and the Baseline Survey with a sample
representing the total South African voting population.
THE FOCUS GROUP RESULTS ON OBSTACLES
The biggest problems that were identified in the 1992 voter education research were the
"mood of the period" and confusion about politics and voting. A mood of despondence,
because of the protracted transition and the high incidence of violence, was undermining the
anticipation to vote. Fear appeared to be a bigger deterrent than lack of knowledge. At that
early stage it became clear that to ensure high participation, voters would have to be
reassured about anonymity of voting, as well as personal safety and protection at the time
of voting. Many of these reassurances, however, would only be credible in specific
circumstances and closer to the election.
The mood among the uncertain voters:
The mood among the uncertain voters (a large proportion of the electorate at that stage)
reflected both disillusionment with change up to that time and an impatience for more
change. The four major issues on the minds of these uncertain voters were violence (political
and criminal), the economy and unemployment, racial injustice, and education. This mood
related to the immediate social conditions of the participants. A brief analysis provides vivid
contrasts with the expectations of elections outlined in Section 3.
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There was a possibility that ongoing violence could alienate these voters from the election
process. They strongly resented what they often saw as ongoing, self-interested power
struggles between the ANC and the IFP. These struggles were seen to take precedence over
the people's concerns about their own lives. African and Indian voters increasingly were
wondering about their future. In the words of two African working class men from Durban
and Johannesburg: "We are talking about the new South African and yet we are still killing
each other. This confuses me. I don't know where we are going" and "People are always
talking about the new South Africa. I don't see any change for the better".
The economy was the second most prevalent issue on the minds of the uncertain voters. It
aroused discussion in every focus group. The economy was equated with unemployment, and
associated with crime, hunger and starvation, poor education and lack of housing. Despair
characterised the mood on the economy, especially among the African participants. The
words of this African man from Gazankulu and working class woman from Soweto were
typical of the mood expressed: "Presently I own nothing, I won't be able to own anything
... I will have to toil until my dying day" and "We are losing hope ..."
Signs of a potential change in the mood emerged in the fact that voters largely associated the
lack of progress in politics and social life in South Africa with continuing white dominance
of politics. There was a low-key but potent resentment of whites throughout the focus groups.
"Things have changed, but I still do the same job, I'm still treated as a black. So the changes
have no meaning" (African middle class woman, Johannesburg) or "When a black meets a
white, all a black has in mind is fear, because these two nations are enemies" (female
African farm worker. Orange Free State). These are experiences that convey a sense of the
association of lack of political and social progress with ongoing white domination.
A profound sense of continued racial-economic disempowerment came from African women
(at its strongest in rural South Africa). Related, workplace themes were that whites do not
pay much, exploit farm labour, and get better jobs on lower qualifications or less experience.
For instance: "The white man just watches as the black man sweats, he just stand there and
at the end of the day he gets more money" (African working class woman, Durban), or "The
ordinary labourers have to pay for the big bosses" (coloured woman, Paarl).
The focus group research showed a strong association between hope for a better future and
hope for an improvement in education. It was also especially the women who continuously
talked about their hope that better education would at least help to ensure a better future for
their children, even if they themselves could not benefit.
Issues in "getting out the vote" of the uncertain voters:
The uncertain voters had serious fears and doubts about two election related issues. Would
elections lead to death, intimidation, loss of property? Secondly, will elections have a real
effect on their lives? At the time of the research these sentiments were particularly strong
among African voters, both women and men, rural and urban, and from all socio-economic
classes. It was clear that among African voters there was not a commitment to abstain (such
determination was much stronger among coloured voters), but there were forces, here
referred to as "costs", which at that stage were inhibiting their commitment to vote.
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The research identified the four major "costs" in the voting process us l'eur of violence anil
intimidation; confusion about parties, policies and the democratic process; cynicism about
the fairness of the electoral process and the prospects lor change; and a lack of voter
education.
FEAR was the most salient aspect of the uncertain voters' reluctance to vote. Women often
expressed these fears: "If I vote for somebody, you may find that a lot of people may die
because of my vote" (African working class woman, Soweto) or "I would be fearful to vote -
- 1 am afraid to die" (woman farm worker, Orange Free State). The rural African focus
groups had strong fears about violence, intimidation, and revenge because of "wrong" voting.
Urban African focus groups were simultaneously most excited and most fearful of elections.
In eight of the eleven African urban focus groups there was substantial support for
abstention, should conditions of violence and intimidation not improve.
The focus group participants expressed a widespread belief in the absence of a climate of free
political activity. When they were asked to react to a fictitious radio announcement that
"South Africa's first democratic election has just been agreed to", many (and overwhelmingly
women) associated the announcement with images of violence and death ("killings",
"murder"), mayhem, rampages, intimidation, victimisation, revenge and destruction of
property. Women's reaction to the announcement included: "When we hear of an election,
we think of death", "There will be war. And many people will die", "Intimidation is the first
thing that comes to mind", "The violence will be on a large scale".
The participants were convinced that intimidation could make them change their votes. This
African middle class man from Soweto said: "I would vote for a party to avoid being
victimised, for the sake of our children ... what would YOU do?" Or, this working class
woman from Soweto: "(Intimidation) can make me change my mind or stop me from voting
to save my life". There was also a fear that election could bring intimidation TO
PARTICIPATE, for instance: "There will be children toyi-toying in the street, looking for
those who are not going to vote, and next thing a stone is thrown through your window"
(African working class man, Durban).
Who would be responsible for intimidation? In the minds of the focus group participants
virtually no-one escaped suspicion. The main suspects, in the words of the participants: the
seniors in our village, Zulus, the IFP and homeland leaders, employers, white farmers, the
(NP) government, the ANC, whites, those who live comfortably, etc. The most common
source identified was the (then) Government, the state and ethnic actors. Inkatha was often
spontaneously singled out.
There was a widespread fear among African voters about "talking politics to strangers", for
instance in a taxi, or on the train, or while walking home or to the shops. This applied
especially to African women and to men in the urban areas. These were some of the
reactions to the focus group question: "Would you talk politics to strangers?": "We are
scared to death of doing that", "I will be dead if I talk to the IFP", "We just pray for a safe
journey when we travel with strangers", "If I differ from her, she might trace me after that
with a whole mob of her friends and she can kill me", "He or she might belong to a wrong
political organisation ... the one that kills people ... The one called Inkatha".
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The focus group voters had mixed feelings about the secrecy of their votes. Whilst some
feared that their ballots could be identified after the election (for instance by regional
governments), many situated secrecy in the social context of voting. While the vote itself
may be secret, the "society is politics" and "everybody knows" who you normally support.
The mere act of casting a vote would mean that it would not be secret, they surmised.
CYNICISM about the value of the individual vote, the fairness of the electoral process, and
the ability of a new government to change things, were indications of the second major
potential obstacle to high electoral participation. These concerns were fairly widespread.
Uncertain voters would need reassurances that each individual vote would count, that the
elections process would not be corrupted, that a new government would be able to solve
social problems and thereby make a difference, and that violence would decrease with the
installation of a new government.
.Urban African and coloured focus group participants were more likely to emphasise the
importance of their individual votes than rural African or Indian participants. "You may find
that the person who is wanted by the majority just needs one vote to win ... then maybe we
can have peace" (African working class woman, Durban), or "My vote will carry back to
the government, it will help to change things in South Africa", said a coloured working class
woman from Paarl.
Cynicism prevailed around possible fraud and corruption in elections. Corruption, rigging
the vote, and bribery were the major concerns. On the one hand, there were those who said
that they would only vote if they could be guaranteed that the election would be free and fair.
On the other hand, there was an acceptance of unfairness as an inevitability. Examples of
fraud in Namibia, Angola and elsewhere in Africa permeated the focus group discussions on
the "free and fairness" of the forthcoming South African elections. "Fraud and cheating is
something that one will never be able to avoid", said an African working class man from
Durban.
Cynicism about whether a new (interpreted as black) government would be a "responsible"
government regularly emerged as a factor which could discourage participation. Uncertainty
about whether a new government could make a difference was weighed up against possibly
unsafe conditions at the polls: If a new government would not be more responsible or capable
than the old NP government, why risk going to the polls? Women were somewhat more
cynical about the ability of a new government to make a difference than the men in the focus
groups. They feared nepotism, corruption and lack of caring by politicians. Among rural
Africans the cynicism was often linked to experiences with the bantustan governments.
Others spoke more generally: "New governments promise many things, and yet these
promises do not happen" (female OFS farm worker), or "People have been suffering. So now
... they put into their pockets what they have lost over the years" (African middle class
woman, Durban).
Participants were particularly cynical about a new government's ability to bring an end to
violence, especially if some political groupings could possibly refuse to accept election
results. There were doubts about the Zulus, the white right-wing, and "those who lose the
election".
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CONFUSION about parties and their policies emerged us the third potential obstacle to high
participation. It was especially the African (both rural and urban) purticipants who said they
would abstain, unless they become better informed about party policies and programmes.
Whilst they identified violence as a major factor preventing party political access to the
voters, they did not exonerate the parties from this responsibility. As this African middle
class man from Soweto said: "I see no reason why people would not want to vote if they are
well informed ... But they are not well informed." An Indian woman from Durban related
voting and information to trust: "If they don't prove themselves, and give us something to
vote for, I'll never vote."
The LACK OF VOTER EDUCATION featured fairly low-key among potential reasons for
abstaining, at least at that stage of the process. The discussions indicated that whilst there
was a major need for voter education, most of the participants did not identify this as a
potential reason for not voting.
The "voting day" discussions sometimes centred around specific reconstructions of what the
process around voting stations would be like: "There are boxes which say PAC or IFP or
ANC. You can put your paper in any of these boxes. You will have ticked alongside the
party you want and your name will be there" (African informal housing man, Soweto), or
"It is only the guards who will know who you voted for" (African working class man,
Durban). A mock ballot exercise in the focus groups created much advice and discussion,
despite moderators urging participants to quietly "cast" their own votes.
THE BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS ON OBSTACLES
Why would significant numbers of voters not want to vote in an election with the historical
significance of the first truly democratic election in South Africa?" The Matla Baseline
Survey showed that there was no single, simple answer. But many of the answers centred
around the "confusion factor". Because of not knowing enough about wh.il was happening
in politics and transition in South Africa, many voters felt left-behind. Tin. > lost, or never
gained, interest in voting. A further element of confusion was directly related to the voting
process. Many of the abstainers said they "Don't know enough about voting and elections".
The analysis below shows the extent to which many doubted the secrecy of their ballots, did
not have identity documents, and spoilt their ballots in mock voting.
The demographic groups in the South African voting population who fell most disempowered
on the different dimensions of the "confusion factor" are identified below. The demographic
disempowerment analysis in this section focuses on gender, age, education and levci of
urbanisation. These are analysed in relation to identity documents, ballot secrecy, and low
access to the mass media. Mock ballots are analysed in terms of regional and level of
urbanisation differences.
Reasons for not wanting to vote:
Foremost among the reasons given by the African voters who said that they would not vote,
was the fact that they did not understand what was going on in politics in South Africa, then
followed "personal reasons" (like age, religion), not knowing enough about elections and
voting, and not understanding enough about political parlies and their policies. In the tilth
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place was the lack of identity documents. The lack of understanding of what was going on
in politics in South Africa was consistently stated as a major reason in all of the regions. A
total of 58% of the African voters in the Western Cape who indicated that they would not
vote, gave the lack of identity documents as their reason. This compared with the 17% of
the African voters in Natal (the second highest intended regional abstention) who mentioned
lack of ID as the deterrent to voting. The fear of violence at this stage did not rate among
the top reasons in any of the regions. All indications are that the climate in the country with
regard to voting had started changing. (See Table 3, Appendix 3.)
The 19% of coloured voters who at that stage intended abstaining were mostly motivated by
a lack of understanding of politics, followed by a lack of interest, or apathy, and not
knowing enough about parties and policies. For PWV coloured voters a lack of trust in
political parties and leaders was the most important reason. For Indian voters (23% of whom
did not want to vote at that stage) "just not interested" was the most important reason, trailed
by not understanding what was happening in politics in South Africa, and personal reasons.
The Natal Indian voters overwhelmingly gave this lack of interest as their reason, but for
PWV Indian voters it was the combination of not knowing enough about elections, too much
fighting between political parties, and the feeling that individual votes would not make a
difference. White voters who wanted to abstain were driven by personal reasons, a lack of
trust in parties and politicians, and the feeling that their (white) votes would not make a
difference amidst the large number of black voters."
Despite smaller differences, we therefore see a large measure of convergence in reasons for
not wanting to vote in all major race sectors of the South African voting population.
The identity document proWnr
The Matla research showed that identity documents could be a major disenabling factor in
the election, especially for African, but also for coloured voters. A total of 11% of African
and 10% of coloured voters did not have any of the documents that would entitle them to
vote. These (official) identity documents included "homeland" ID's, South African travelling
documents, the old "passes", etc. 2% of coloured and 3% of African voters reported that
they did not have any identity documents at all. Of those who lacked official identity
documents, 9% of African and 7% of coloured voters did have birth or baptismal certificates.
(Indian and white voters had no virtually identity document problems.) (See Diagram 2,
Appendix 2.)
A regional comparison of African voters demonstrates the diversity of the identity document
problem in the run-up to the election. The regions worst affected were the Northwest, the
Eastern Cape and the Eastern Transvaal. Between 11% and 16% of these voters only had
birth or baptismal certificates as their form of identification. Following these regions, 6%
of African voters in the Western Cape and 4% in the Eastern Cape had no identity documents
at all. (See Table 4, Appendix 3.)
"Demographic disempowerment" only manifested itself to some extent with regard to the
possession of identity documents. Except for Natal and the Northern Transvaal, there were
consistently more women than men who either Only had birth or baptismal certificates, or
had no identity documents at all. The gender gap was generally around 4%. Different
dynamics operated with regard to age. In contrast with other facets of voter empowerment.
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where ihe older voters were at a disadvantage, it was the young (17-24 years) who lacked
identity documents. The extreme case was the Eastern Cape, where 48% fewer of the
youngest than Ihe oldest age category only had birth or baptismal or no identity documents.
In the other regions these discrepancies varied from 24% in Natal to 38% in the Northwest.
Level of education failed to distinguish clearly between those with and without appropriate
identity documents. Generally it was the voters on the mid-levels of education (Standards 5-8)
who were least likely to have appropriate ID's. The general trend, with a couple of minor
exceptions, was that the more rural voters would have fewer valid identity documents. This
trend was the strongest in the Eastern Cape, the Northwest and the PWV (the latter with a
limited number of rural voters).
Uncertainty about ballot secrecy:
Whereas doubt about the secrecy of the ballot was not regularly volunteered as the most
important reason for possible abstention, there were significant numbers of voters who either
were not sure or believed it would be possible for others to find out who they had voted for.
In conditions of violence or intimidation the absence of a belief in secrecy could deter people
from voting.
The belief in ballot secrecy was the highest among African voters, followed, in this order,
by white, Indian and coloured. 20% of coloured voters were not sure whether the ballot
would be secret or not. (See Diagram 3, Appendix 2.) Regionally among African voters,
doubt about secrecy was the highest in Natal and the Eastern Transvaal - the two regions
with the largest proportions of voters who indicated that they would not vote. In Natal 22%
were not sure whether the ballot would be secret or not (a further 5% thought the ballot was
definitely not secret) and in the Eastern Transvaal 14% were not sure (with 4% more
believing the ballot would definitely not be secret). The highest belief in the secrecy of the
ballot was found in the Northern Transvaal (89%) and the PWV and OFS (85%). Around
30% of coloured voters in all sampled regions had some doubts about ballot secrecy. (See
Table 5, Appendix 3.)
Belief in ballot secrecy consistently across the regions went down with gender changing to
female, increasing age, lower education, and moving out of the metropolitan and urban areas.
Gender disempowerment was most pronounced in Natal. 81% of men and 66% of women
believed in the secrecy of the ballot. In the Eastern Transvaal the gender gap was 89% versus
75%. Gender differences in other regions ranged from 2% in the PWV to between 4% and
9% in the rest. The age category of 50 years or older consistently emerged as disempowered
in relation to the two other age categories used for analysis (17 to 24, and 25 to 49 years).
Natal and the Eastern Transvaal again stood out - in Natal approximately 20% fewer of this
age group than the two other groups believed that their votes would be secret. In the Eastern
Transvaal the gap was 11% and 15%, respectively. The Northwest and the Western Cape
had similar trends. The impact of education on empowerment trends was small in the cases
of the PWV, the Northwest, the Western Cape, and the OFS, and big in the remainder of
the regions. Well over 20% of the lowest education group (Standard 4 or lower) in Natal did
not believe in the secrecy of the ballot, with the discrepancy in the Northern Transvaal and
the Eastern Cape also very high. 17% more of those in the mid-education category, and 13%
more of the voters in the high education category (Standard 9 plus) believed in ballot
secrecy. It was only in some of the regions that the level of urbanisation made a difference
to empowerment - it did especially in the Eastern Cape and Natal. In the Eastern Cape 20%
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fewer of the rural than the urban and metropolitan voters believed in the secrecy of their
ballots. In Natal the discrepancy was around 14%, and in the PWV 11%.
This demographic analysis pointed to likely lower voter turnout in a number of regions.
Looking at the demographic distributions in the regions, it would be the regions with more
of the lower educated, higher ages, less urbanisation, and more women where lower turnouts
could be expected.
Low access to the mass media:
A demographic analysis of the level of access to the mass media shows significant differences
among the major gender, age, education and urbanisation categories." Given the gender,
age, education and urbanisation gaps in empowerment to vote, more equal trends with regard
to exposure to the mass media would improve chances of empowerment through access to
voter education and political information. However, differential access and exposure, in line
with the already existing gaps, would further reinforce disempowerment. The general finding
from this part of the analysis was that discrepant exposure levels indeed tended to reinforce
the prior demographic inequalities. The information analysed in this section is based on
answers to the question: "Where do you get your information about what is happening in
politics in the country?" (See Table 6, Appendix 3.)
It was only with regard to access to the radio that African women sometimes fared slightly
better (and not statistically significant) than men. Across all regions, men were more (and
often much more) exposed to political information on television and in newspapers. This
correlates with men generally having higher levels of education than the women. The regions
with the largest gender gaps were most of the "Northern belt" of South Africa - the
Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal and the Northwest -- plus the Eastern Cape. The
older the voters, the more disadvantaged they were in terms of access to mass media sources
of political information. Large age gaps existed between the 50+ age group and the other
two age categories. In the majority of regions, the 24-49 year olds had the most access, both
to television and to daily newspapers. The gap between the older and the mid-category often
was well over 30%, and in the case of the Northwest and access to television, the gap
between these two age groups was 54%. It was only in the Northern Transvaal that people
with the lowest of the three levels of education had significantly less access to radio than the
better educated. Radio would be the mass medium with by far the best reach among those
in need of voter education. The voters with a Standard 9+ education had up to 50% in the
Eastern Cape, 48% in the Northern Transvaal, and 46% in Natal, more access to television
than those with a Standard 4 or lower education. Obviously (because of the close association
between literacy and formal education), the gap with regard to newspaper access would be
large between the lowest and highest educated. These gaps went up to 81% in the case of the
OFS, and 73% for the Northern Transvaal and the Northwest. In most other regions this gap
was around the 60% level. The trend with regard to level of urbanisation was commonly
that radio was the best medium for the rural areas. The exposure gap opened up on access
to television and was huge on newspaper usage.
Spoilt ballots:
The major indication of voting disempowerment, and need for ballot literacy voter education,
was obtained through the mock ballot analysis. Because the ballots were completely
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anonymous, only national trends, regional comparisons, and level of urbanisation analyses
could be done.
There were high rates of spoilt ballots, ranging from 4% to 10% in the different regions. The
rate was 10% nationally for African voters, and 9% for Indian voters.18 The biggest single
reason for spoilt ballots among African voters was illiteracy -- 4% of the respondents
indicated to the interviewer that they could not read or write, and thus could not complete
the ballot. It is possible than many illiterate voters nevertheless managed to cast their mock
ballots. Another 4% of African voters made mistakes in voting, including more than one
cross, the cross not in the right block, signed their names, or even wrote "I don't know how
to vote". Similar percentages of coloured, Indian and white voters made these mistakes. (See
Table 7, Appendix 3.)"
A regional comparison showed that the largest ballot spoilage problem occurred in the
Northern belt: the Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal and the Northwest. In these
three regions, as well as in Natal, rural voters were also much more disempowered than
urban and (where applicable) metropolitan voters. In the Northwest, rural spoilage rates went
up to 28% of mock ballots cast (and 14% spoilage in the urban areas of the Northwest). In
the Eastern Transvaal the rural rate was 22% (compared with 15% urban) and in the
Northern Transvaal 20% (compared with 2% urban spoilage). Natal and the Eastern Cape,
two regions in which some other voter education problems have already been identified, had
relatively low rates of spoilage (10% and 8% rural spoilage, respectively). (See Diagram 4,
Appendix 2.)
The regional breakdowns also show that illiteracy in the rural areas was the major reason for
spoilage in the high-spoilage-regions of the Northern and the Eastern Transvaal. The
Northwest was the only region where "genuine spoilage" was particularly high.
In this section we have seen the potentially huge disempowering effect of confusion - of not
understanding what is going on in politics in the country, or of not knowing enough about
voting and elections. Certain demographic groups, for instance women, or, generally, older,
less educated, or more rural people, have even more intense experiences of disempowerment.
Does the apparent success of the April 1994 South African election (see Section 5) mean that
voters now are empowered to take a full and active participative role in representative
democracy? The research and specific conditions in the April elections caution against such
assumptions. First, the success of participation in the election depended on extensive
assistance at the voting stations, as well as very flexible ballot acceptance rules. Second,
voting is one of the "easiest" forms of political participation. There are clear definitions of
what this form of participation requires, everybody is motivated, and the circumstances are
very special. South Africans across the board are not yet equipped for ongoing participation
in the processes of representative democracy. Many skills remain to be leamt for this
democracy to closely reflect their expectations and needs. In addition, widespread and
ongoing processes need to be adopted to empower ordinary South Africans with the political
information which could prevent them from receding into the disempowerment of political
confusion.
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5. ASSESSMENT OF PARTICIPATION OUTCOMES IN THE ELECTION
Two major aspects of the overall success story of the South African election were that the
turnout was high, and that the rate of spoilt ballots was low. Also, the interaction between
the two factors, and the peace and good will that reigned on the four voting days, cannot be
underestimated. This short section assesses the voter education dimensions of the election
outcome.
In a modest way, this research project facilitated Matla Trust activities in campaigning for
conditions which would provide maximum assistance to inexperienced voters at the polls. It
also assisted in the choice of the most appropriate mass media for disseminating voter
education information, and in targeting voter education materials at the demographic groups
who most needed voter education. In pointing to the devastating effect that violence could
have on the election, the project also emphasised the need for dissemination of information
on the rights and protection of voters going to the polls. In many cases it was the inputs of
the major voter education agencies that secured these user-friendly processes. Assistance
inside voting stations, by Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and party political
officials, was also lobbied for by voter educators. Politics-free zones around voting stations
further helped ensure peace of mind.
Voter education programmes had a significant input into addressing the voter education
needs. The challenges of voter empowerment were taken up by organisations specifically
created to conduct voter education, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, civic and
community organisations, foreign government institutions, the South African government and
various state department and parastatals, business organisations, political parties, churches,
universities, and others. Voter education activities took a variety of forms, ranging from
extended and systematic mass media campaigns, to community and workplace based mock
elections and plays. In addition, informal, person-to-person voter education is not
quantifiable, but was hugely important.
It remains difficult to estimate how many voters were reached by voter education. It is even
more problematic to assess the success of voter education. One indication was provided by
a CASE tracking study for IFEE (CASE/IFEE, 1994). Estimates were, for instance, that
around 11,2 million adult Africans saw some specific voter education television
advertisement. A total of 8,8 million people (not diversified by voter status) saw some of the
series of IFEE television advertisements. Similarly, it was estimated that 9,8 million people
heard IFEE radio advertisements. In studying newspaper penetration, it was estimated that
79% of African newspaper readers and 81% of coloured newspaper readers were reached by
voter education (the percentages of African and coloured voters reached would be
substantially lower).20
Ballot spoilage:
The level of spoilage of the ballots in the April election was extremely low. Of the more than
20 million votes cast, only 1% was spoilt. A comparison of the Baseline Survey (with a
margin of error of 3% nationally) and the election outcome, point to a dramatic change in
levels of ballot literacy. This constitutes strong circumstantial evidence that voter education
and empowerment had been largely successful.
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The total number of votes that was rejected (spoilt ballots), nationally in South Africa, was
193 081. This amounted to 0,98% or 1%, of the total number of votes cast (IEC statement,
5 June 1994). The spoilt ballot rates did not vary much between the provinces: 0,6% for the
Eastern Cape; 0,7% PWV; 0,9%.Northern Transvaal; 1,1% Orange Free State and Northern
Cape; 1,2% Western Cape, Natal and Northwest; 1,3% Eastern Transvaal.
Level of participation:
An exact calculation of the level of participation in the 25-29 April 1994 election is
impossible. South Africa neither had a voters roll nor even fairly precise information about
the number of voters. The estimates of the number of voters generally ranged from 22,5 to
24 million. At least 20 million of these voters had voted for the first time in legitimate
national elections.
All indications, albeit subjective, are that the level of voter participation in the election was
over 80%. Based on a voting population of 22,7 million, the percentage poll was 86,9%. If
the voting population is set at 24 million, the percentages poll changes to 82,2%.
Based on the. low estimate of a national electorate of 22,7 million, the regional percentage
polls range from the highest of 93% for the Northern Cape to the lowest of 83% for Natal.
The percentage poll for the different regions, based on a 22,7 million electorate, was (with
Baseline Survey findings, based in some cases on somewhat different but mostly comparable
regional boundaries, in brackets): 83% Natal (74%); 85% Eastern Transvaal (74%), 85%
Orange Free State (84%) and 85% Northern Transvaal (84%); 87% PWV (83%); 89%
Western Cape (95%); 90% Eastern Cape (93%); 91% Northwest (89%); and 93% Northern
Cape. Should it be assumed that the actual size of the electorate was 24 million, and that the
proportions of voters per region remain the same, the percentage polls for each of the regions
would be 78% Natal; 81% Eastern Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Transvaal;
83% PWV; 85% Western Cape; 86% Eastern Cape and Northwest; and 89% Northern Cape.
The percentage poll range on this upper estimate of the electorate therefore is 78% (Natal)
to 89% (Northern Cape). Whatever therefore the estimates of the size of the electorate, the
average national turnout was over 80%, and well over 80% for most of the individual
provinces. The national average poll was significantly reduced by the low poll in Natal,
which constitutes approximately 20% of South Africa's total population.
6. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
This case study focused on dimensions of empowerment of the South African electorate. It
explored the level of voting skill empowerment that was indicated before the historic April
1994 election, and pointed out how different regions and demographic groups appeared
systematically disempowered. It also investigated extent of empowerment through motivation
to vote. The fairly extensive analysis of both motivation for abstention and for voting shed
light on areas to bear in mind in future work to consolidate democracy in South Africa.
Furthermore, the analysis of reasons for voting present us with useful information on what
democracy and the act of voting meant to the new South African electorate. The Matla Trust
Focus Groups and Baseline Survey provided a sound assessment of the meaning which South
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African voters attached to their votes -- of what they hoped to achieve by casting their votes
in the election. The attainment of freedom, equal rights, and democracy had an acute
importance to them. The meaning of these concepts did not end with the casting of a ballot
and the installation of a new government. Many voters directly articulated vast social needs,
like housing, education for themselves and their children, better living conditions in general,
or jobs. Their wish for liberation had specific content. The Matla Baseline Survey provided
us with concrete information on the diversity and the distribution of these needs. The study
also informs us, in much detail, on what the needs of different demographic groups, within
regions and race, are. In addition, it familiarises us with important details of the expectations
directed at the new South African government. In these respects, the Matla research has
direct relevance for our understanding of the social dynamics which are bound to shape the
post-election milieu.
South Africa's transition thus far, with the aid of voter education programmes and research,
has set the base for the ongoing development of democracy. Through the empowerment of
voters and the generally high levels of turnout, South Africa has taken the first steps towards
democracy. The first test for the procedures of democracy, the 1994 election, was largely
passed. Voters have gained a large measure of confidence in their own ability to cast votes
and to be part of this democratic process. Voter education initiatives took notable steps to
address various demographic disparities: Yet, the entrenchment and continued acceptance of
the "rules of democracy" still have to be proven. Similarly, voting is only one small form
of political participation- For democracy to become entrenched and to have a daily meaning
for ordinary people, democracy education for other forms of political participation is also
required. Voting is the easiest form of political participation. Further skills training and
ongoing information to counter political confusion are called for.
The high turnout in the South African election should be seen as the starting point for a
process of deepening of democracy in South Africa. Potentially far-reaching empowerment
took place through the act of voting. It is important that this existing empowerment be further
harnessed into an ability of continuous involvement. Democracy in South Africa can only
become consolidated if the vote becomes a precursor to having access to information as well
as the skills for ongoing presentation of demands.
Through their participation in this research project, either as focus group participants or as
respondents in the baseline survey, thousands of South Africans helped to set the course for
a democratic government and the substantive development of democracy in South Africa. The
broader project for the entrenchment of democracy in South Africa has to continue.
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NOTES
1. My (banks to Matla Trust for the permission to share this information with a
broader community. Whilst I played a big part in the whole research project, a large
team of people contributed. My special thanks to a number of people who, in the
process of this research, broadened my insights: Jos Kuper, Kim Kruger and Carrol
Moore. The current author did the research upon which much of this paper is based
as a part of Research Initiatives. Research Initiatives was commissioned by Matla
Trust for the three phase voter education research project. The second partner in
Research Initiatives was C. Charney. He was part of the research team referred to
above, and focused on the voter education analyses of the phase 2, an overview
survey. This was an interim, preparatory stage of the research process, and is not
incorporated into this paper. The framework for analysis and interpretation in the
current paper remains the sole responsibility of the current author.
2. The major "voting skills" addressed in the research project are "ballot literacy"
(the knowledge and skills of how to complete and cast a valid ballot), the possession
of identity documents, and knowledge about the secrecy of the ballot. The major
motivation issues addressed are vote intention, and the reasons for wanting to vote,
or intending to abstain.
3. Empowerment in this paper is used to refer to programmes, processes and
strategies designed to facilitate participation and possession of skills on an equal basis
to all demographic groups, including along the dimensions of gender, age, education
and level of urbanisation. In addition, empowerment entails being equipped with the
information and knowledge that make people feel they know what they are
participating in, and why they are doing it.
4. A later follow-up evaluation study was done by CASE for the Matla Trust, using
a much smaller sample, with a view to providing a further national overview of
progress with voter education efforts (see CASE/IFEE, 1994).
5. "Uncommitted" in this paper refers to those voters who in recruitment for the
focus groups said that they do not know for certain which political party they would
vote for. There was also a control question in the recruitment questionnaire. This
question was used to "sift out" potential participants who, despite their answers to the
first question, had strong party political views. "Uncertain turnouts" simply mean
those voters who may end up not voting.
6. Phase 2 of this research project, an overview survey of limited size and objectives,
is not analysed in this paper. This phase served as preparation for the Baseline Survey,
which is extensively analysed in this paper.
7. The subsequent changes to the boundaries of the regions/provinces mainly entailed
adjustments to the Northwest and the Western Cape. The Northern Cape region, with
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a very small voting population, was created out of these two regions. The boundary
adjustments for other regions were either minor or none.
8. Focus groups is a suitable research methodology in cases where one wishes to
explore motivations, feelings and values which underlie, for instance, voting
behaviour. It facilitates deeper insights into people's thinking. Homogeneity in the
composition of the groups is essential in order to get spontaneity in the discussions.
9. One of the first, truly national samples was used also in 1993 in a poll conducted
by the Department of Constitutional Development in a survey of constitutional issues.
Subsequently, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) also started using
appropriate national samples. Many of the well-known public surveys, for instance
those conducted by Markinor or MMR for the Argus company in the past used either
very small rural African samples, or only African metropolitan samples. These
particular Markinor surveys were done for commercial concerns. They therefore
concentrated on areas where tbe "buying power" would be. It is not known to what
extent private party political polling, or other'government department polling projects,
employed truly national samples.
10. This section presents a brief overview of the major issues that emerged from the
research. It cannot hope to do justice to the complex and diversified findings of the
total research project. The ownership of research rests with Matla and the final report,
incorporating summaries of the first two phases of the project, are available from
Matla Trust.
11. See the series of surveys conducted by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy
and the Human Sciences Research Council, 1994.
12. Standard 4 was taken as the cut-off point for the lowest category of education,
because "standard 4 or higher" indicates the likely level of being literate.
13. As noted in the section of research methodology, tables and diagrams
summarising the details of the demographic trends are not included in the current
paper, purely because of constraints of space. The reading of arguments in tbe text
does not depend on additional information in table form. Additional tabular
information can be checked with the author.
14. This phase of the research did not explore all dimensions of the possible reasons
for these regional differences. It only deals with reasons related to empowerment and
voting. Possible additional reasons could lie in the particular political culture, and
political and socio-economic experiences in the regions. These could be useful themes
for further research.
15. The proportion of voters who intended to abstain was referred to in Section 3.
This section deals with their motivations.
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16. Detailed regional demographic analyses of (be African voters' reasons for not
wanting to vote were not performed, because the number of cases became too small
for statistically valid analyses.
17. No separate analysis is being done of the ordinary patterns of exposure to the
mass media, because such analyses yield commonsensical data. Those trends which
are interesting with regard to the African voters are included in this current section
of the analysis.
18. The Indian spoilage was largely attributable to these voters either making more
than one cross, or writing on the mock ballot that they had not yet made up their
minds (or something similar). In the context of access to media, etc. the Indian voters
were not considered as seriously in need of voter education.
19. The eventual election criteria for ballot validity were very flexibly defined. Some
ballots which therefore were counted as "spoilt" in this research project would have
been accepted in the election's ballot counting. It was largely in response to voter
education research that the flexible criteria were set.
20. The sample in this study was fairly small (1600 African and 400 coloured), and
the regional and rural bases sometimes not very representative.
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APPENDIX 1: THEMES OF DISCUSSION GUIDE AND QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
]
THEMES IN THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE
Mood:
How participants feel about things happening in South Africa, also prompted to talk about
the economy.
The election:
* Fictitious radio announcement, followed by a question on what the election means to them.
* Do they think they would vote in this election? Why? Or, why not?
* Do they think that voting in an election can help to change things in South Africa? In their
lives? How?
* Mock ballot exercise. Pretend that this is voting day ...
* Do you believe that your vote will be secret? It this was a real election, would you worry
about somebody finding out who you voted for?
* Do you believe there will be intimidation? Will this stop people voting or make them
change their votes?
* Do you ever talk politics to strangers? Probe.
THEMES OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
Demographics:
Details were supplied on gender, age, race, nature of housing, level of urbanisation, home
language, level of education, employment, religion, number of people in household, number
of wage earners, and income.
Specific voter education items:
* Respondents were asked whether they had any of a specified range of identity documents.
* Regarding ballot secrecy, the question was asked whether the person thought anyone else
could find out who they had voted for (even if the person did not tell them).
* The respondents were asked to complete a mock ballot form. These were completed
anonymously, and "cast" into a mock ballot box.
Motivation to vote:
* The respondents were asked whether they personally would vote (or not) if the election
took place "tomorrow".
* Thereafter they were asked, depending on their answer to the first question, to identify
the most important reason why they want to vote, or do not want to vote.
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Access to the mass media:
* The voters were asked where they get their information about what is happening in politics
in the country. They were also probed about other possible ways in which they also get
information.
* They were also asked how often they watch television, listen to the radio or read
newspapers.
* There were also probed on which particular media were being used.
* Media credibility was assessed by asking the respondents which of each of the three media
typed they trust and believe.
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